Myths, Mines and Ground Clearance by Smith, Andy
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 7 
Issue 2 The Journal of Mine Action Article 46 
August 2003 
Myths, Mines and Ground Clearance 
Andy Smith 
Humanitarian Mine Action Specialist 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, 
Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and Conflict 
Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Andy (2003) "Myths, Mines and Ground Clearance," Journal of Mine Action : Vol. 7 : Iss. 2 , Article 
46. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol7/iss2/46 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 







Myths, Mines and 
Ground Clearance 
Building on an article published in issue 2.3 of this Journal, the author 
discusses some ofthe prevailing myths that beset the humanitarian demining 
(HD) industry and which he believes restrict its progress. Intended as a 
discussion prompt, some of the points he makes may be contentious. 
by Andy Smith, AVS Mine 
Action Consultants 
In 1998, I wrote an arricle for th is 
journal about common myths in mine 
clearance. Since that time, I have received 
many messages supporting what I wrote, 
a nd none taking the opposing view. The 
last of these messages was received just a 
couple of months ago- showing that rhe 
on line back issues of this journal are still 
being used. It may be useful for you to 
read over rhar article before arguing 
strongly against anything in th is article 
(see http:// maic. j mu.edu/journal/2.3/ fea-
rures/myths.htm). 
Looking over rhe original arricl e, I 
would change a few lines and alter the 
stress here and the re, but I believe that 
the list remains a relevant record of 
unhelpful myths. 
A few have been partly addressed, 
then forgotten. For example, the devel-
opment of the new International Mine 
Action Standards (!MAS) was based on 
an acceptance that it was nor up to the 
West ro d ictate derails of operation ro 
National Authorities. T his was largely 
responsible for the relative success of those 
standards, but may be being forgotten as 
more standards are added and the origi-
nal User Focus Group is marginalised. 
A few have become more complicated. 
For example, the use of modern munitions 
rhar act as mines but are nor designed as 
min es com pli cates rhe quest ion of 
whether mine use is really in decline in 
some areas. 
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O ne or rwo have become entrenched. 
For example, the idea that a Western-
tra in ed exp losive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) man is somehow needed or is 
naturally superior to a locally experienced 
demincr is now "presum ed." In fact, more 
trained EOD men serving with Western 
mi litary groups have died in demining 
over the past t hree years than local 
deminers with a few weeks' training. In 
many cases, the highly trained victims 
were so arrogant rhar they took risks that 
d1e locals d id nor dream of doing. T heir 
military training was nor very appropriate. 
What fo llows is a summary of the 
lies, myrhs and misconceptions addressed 
in my last article, with some new addi-
tions appended . 
"If we can send men to 
he moon, we must be 
ble to do better than a 
nan with a prod!" 
Critics often present the "man with 
a prod" as an unsophisticated caveman 
technology. In fac t, it is mo re sophis-
tica ted than any arrificial device yet 
available. No matter how many millions 
of dollars are th rown at robotics, it wi ll 
be a very long time before machines equal 
rhe sophisticated array of data gathering 
and processing equipment rhar is a human 
being. When that is finally achieved, it will 
be even longer before that technology can 
be bu ilt into a low-cost, autonomous, 
se lf-repairing and self-replicating robot 
rhe size of a deminer. 
"Mines are the greatest 
killers in post-conflict 
regions." 
In some areas, this is true. In many 
areas, it is d1e other detritus of war that 
claims th e most lives. The tru th is rhat, 
afte r a confl ict is over and in terna lly 
displ aced persons (lOPs) have returned 
ro rhe home areas, the armaments left 
over after conflict are often the greatest 
killers of civilians. Since I wrote last, the 
term "explosive remnants of war (ERW)" 
has been coined to describe all these 
items, unused or unexploded, which 
often I i tte r barrie areas. Sadly, many of 
the civilian accidents occur as a result of 
deliberate interaction with the muni-
tions-out of curiosity, bravado or (most 
commonly) a desire to earn a few pennies 
by recycling the mat rials in them. 
" ore m1nes are being 
laid than cleared today." 
While still quo ted by the general 
public, I hear this argument less often 
than in former years- which is ironic 
because there is more truth in it now than 
there was five years ago. In conflict areas 
(Chechnya and Iraq, for example), more 
mines have been placed than cleared in 
rhe last year. But in those post-conflict 
areas rhar have a mature mine action 
progra mme (Afghan istan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo, Kurdish 
Iraq , Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique, 
ere.), the claim is simply untrue. Sustained 
dem ini ng efforrs have cleared vast areas 
ofland without any significanr replace-
ment of mines and ordnance. The process 
has suppotted the establishment of stability 
in many ways and has been an essential part 
of internationally supporred efforts tO 
break cycles of violence. 
" 1nes have no place in 
modern warfare." 
T he truth is rhar as long as conflicts 
continue, victim-initiated devices (mines) 
of one kind o r ano ther will be used. 
When rhe ch ips are down, figh ting " By 
All Available Means" (BAAM!) is normal. 
International efforts to alter rhe BAAM 
mindser seem ro be the only way ro 
change this. Genuine concern over the 
long-term effects of weapons will only 
become "fashionable" ifled by the world's 
dominant m ilitary forces. At present, 
Russia, C hina and the United Srares have 
nor banned the use of ami-personnel 
landmines-and all continue to develop 
other indiscrim i na te weapons that 
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serve as victim-activated devices. The 
willingness to use mines in recent conflicts 
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya 
seems to have reversed the successes of 
rhe In rernarional Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (I CBL). So, at rhe start of the new 
millennium, numbers of anti-personnel 
landmines are falling. Bur the use of 
increasingly ind iscrim inate weapons 
is increasing. 
'You can meet deminers 
and find out about 
demining at conferences." 
l define a "humanitarian deminer" 
as someone whose principal day-to-day 
activity involves using his/her eyes, dogs, 
metal detectors, prodders or other means 
to physically clear areas believed to be 
mined. These are almost invariably local 
people. A deminer is nor someone you 
will meet at a conference or someone who 
is paid a Western salary. Those people may 
be Demining Managers and Technical 
Advisers, bur they do nor actually clear 
mines themselves. I can think of only a 
handful of ex-pars who regularly demine 
among rhe many hundreds I have met in 
my travels, and these ex-pars do so our of 
an obsessive personal commitment, nor 
because they are paid to do so. The ex-par 
is far more economically occupied in 
training and management tasks (often, 
20 local deminers can be employed for 
the same daily salary of one ex-par, not 
to mention other costs). 
"Demining is a specialist 
ctivity that takes a long 
ime to learn." 
In almost all countries wirh an active 
HD sector, most field deminers are rela-
tively tmeducared local men. They may have 
a military background, bur this background 
will nor have involved any in-depth train-
ing in mine detection and removal. Some 
organizations have new deminers working 
in a live area within 10 days of starting their 
training. These deminers will then work 
alongside a more experienced person for 
further "on-the-job" training. This system 
works, and from rhe available accident in-
formation, it looks as if rhe highest risk rime 
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among deminers is nor their first weeks or 
even their first year of work. The truth is 
that while demining is a specialist acriviry, 
it does nor rake long to learn. 
''lbe rules of HD must be 
set by Western specialists." 
When I wrote on this last time, the 
United Nations' published rules were widely 
ignored even in programmes under the 
control of rhe UN Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS). Companies and non-govern-
memal organizations (NGO s) made up 
their own rules, often in competition with 
each orher, so best practices were not 
shared . W i th rhe development of 
improved IMAS, this situation has changed 
for rhe berrer. Based on widespread 
consultation and flexibility, the current 
IMAS are far more useful than their 
predecessors. They are being widely 
adopted by individual groups and 
Na tiona! Authorities around the world. Even 
military demining efforts are increasingly 
using the IMAS as a starring point, 
although a few of rhe oldest demining 
organisations hold our and insist on doing 
things as they have always done. 
So rhe rules have changed under rhe 
leadership of Western specialists, people 
who rook great pains ro achieve widespread 
practicality. They led rhe process, and 
they allowed the real world to dictate the 
derail. This was a major achievement, 
and rhe inclusion of provisions to update 
rhe standards regularly was a real break-
through. Bur rhe organisation that 
achieved this was new and dynamic at 
char rime. Today ir seems to be falling into 
the turgid bureaucracy of irs predeces-
sors and spending a great deal of effort 
justifying its own existence rather rhan 
serving the community. A lesson learned 
has been rapidly forgotten. 
Training deminers. 
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The truth is still that West-
ern military training is not an ad-
equate, appropriate or sufficient 
preparation for organizing HD. 
Ir is also true that there is little 
evidence of value in establishing 
a remote bureaucracy to "control" 
the industry unless that bureau-
cracy genuinely listens ro it. 
eequ1pment 
issued to our military 
is the best in the 
world, so should be 
used in HD." Casspir adapted to carry a high-tech sensor. 
The reasons why military equipment 
is rarely the "best" for demining are varied, 
including high cost, inappropriate design 
for the purpose and unnecessary complex-
ity. Military uses are nor the same as those 
in HD. For example, a metal detector may 
be used once a year in the military, but 
wi ll be used for long hours every day in 
demining. The cost of batteries or ergo-
no mic comfort may not be issues for 
occasio nal use, bur are in demining. 
Sim ilarly, the military requiremenr for 
speed can compromise the humanitarian 
requirement for safety- so that an appro-
priate detector for military use may be 
one that-"misses" some metal targets. 
T he truth is that eq uipment de-
signed for a mi litary purpose is rarely 
ideal for use in HD. 
"Locally made demining 
equipment is always of a 
low uality." 
This is often a clear assumption 
behind the attitude of equipment purchas-
ers. It is an attitude fostered by Western 
suppliers of equipment who prefer everyone 
to source through them. The demining 
supply industry is a sophis ticated, 
hard-sell extension of the arms supply 
business, so no o ne should expect it 
to have honesty as one of irs major aims. 
The main advantages of demining groups 
having their equipment supplied from local 
sources are low-cost, ready availability and 
easy maintenance or repair. 
T he truth is that adequate, locally 
made tools and equipment exist and are 
widely used. Sophisticated items such as 
blast visors, body armour and blast-resistant 
hand-tools are also made and supplied 
regionally in Asia and Africa. 
e need to spend 
llllons of dollars and 
se our best brains and 
acilities to develop new 
quipment for demining." 
Since 1994, I have still only seen a few 
areas of major change in the equipment 
used on the grou nd. These are in 
manual deminer tooling, protection, metal 
detectors and mechanical assistance. 
None of the recent changes are the 
direct result of any new expend iture on 
Wes tern research and development 
(R&D), although a few have capitalised 
on field- led breakthroughs. Reasons for 
this failure of R& D effort range from 
confused design cri teria (mixing military 
needs with those ofHD) to plain ignorance 
of the problems in the field. In many cases, 
the inappropriateness of the design has 
been made obvious early in its development, 
but after the funds have been gran ted, 
the work must go on. 
Commercial equipment developers 
have struggled to understand field needs 
far more successfully. Examples include 
the new generation of ground-compen-
sating metal detectors and the increased 
use of rebuilt mine-protected vehicles. 
Many field groups have adapted existing 
plant equipment to meet their mechanical-
assistance needs. Ironically, when they 
have attracted R&D funding to do this, 
their output has been far less focussed and 
cost-effective. 
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The tru th is th at 
de mining equipment has been 
developed in the field at a frac-
tion of the costs being spent 
on developing unsui table 
equipme nt in R&D 
programmes. If some of that 
cost were dedicated ro clear-
ing ground, the money could 
achieve far more in terms of 
ground cleared. 
"A mine cleared is 
a limb saved." 
It is often sai d rha t 
"eve ry mine cleared is a life o r limb 
saved," a s tatement linked ro the no-
tion that "demining is so slow that it 
makes sense ro speed it up by reducing 
rhe quality of the clearance." 
The truth is that incomplete clearance 
of an area can lead to local people believing 
the area is safe-and so starring ro use 
it agai n. Thei r ri sk of injury actua lly 
increases because some of the devices 
were cleared. In this case, a mine cleared 
can be direcdy responsible for a limb lost. 
It is freq uen rly argued that "area 
red uction" need not be as thorough as 
clearance--so it should be acceptable to use 
methods that are known to be inefficient. 
Flai ls and one or other roller systems are 
favourites- many of which are known to 
be very inefficient at detonating pressure 
devices and all of which leave UXO intact. 
The advocates of these machines conve-
niently ignore the fact that UXO causes 
as many civilian injuries as mines in many 
countries. The local people watch the 
impressive machine work and believe that 
the "reduced" area is actually a "safe" area, 
so the distinction berween "area reducti on" 
and "area clearance" is lost on them. T hey 
enter an unsafe area with false con fidence. 
Parr of the reason that people make 
these arguments is a desire ro find a use for 
the machines--developed with millions of 
dollars of research money but never able 
to achieve the clearance levels of manual 
deminers. Another reason is the perceived 
need ro increase rhe speed of clearance 
by using new tech nologies. 
The truth is that it is better to mark a 
dangerous area clearly and leave it until later 
than ro release a dangerous area for use. 
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It is frequendy stared as an obvious 
fact that we are just not working fas t 
enough-and that chis justifies spending 
huge amounts of money trying to develop 
a faster way of clearing the ground than 
by using manual deminers. 
Bur manual demining is nor neces-
sarily slow. It is in some areas-often due 
ro lack of funding but sometimes due to 
inefficient management. In many areas, 
it is remarkably thorough and 
fast, using manual deminers 
assisted by machines and dogs. 
Experience in Europe 
provides evidence that speed 
of clearance is nor really 
rhe issu e. More than 20 
commercial EOD companies 
sti ll operate in Germany, and 
thousands of tons of WWI 
ordnance are known to still 
litter o ld barrie areas in 
Belgium and France. What 
is necessary is to establish a 
sustainable local demining 
capac ity-because so m e 
clea rance is likely to be 
needed for decades ro come, 
no matter how fast people 
work roday. 
The truth is that manual 
demining is only roo slow 
when the necessary funds and 
expertise are denied-and 
that spending clearance 
money on speculative R&D 
does not clear any ground 
at all. 
away from rhe mechanistic in-and-our 
mindset of a military operation and into 
the field of "sustainable development. " 
Many people recognise this, bur rhe 
industry is still dominated by ex-military 
officers at all levels. The reason for this 
dominance is not that demining requires 
any military training or skills-especially 
not those of senior officers. I believe that 
the main reason is that H D was seen as a 
job opportunity for the many ex-officers 
"Never mind 
capacity building, 
clear the area and 
move on." Deminer in Africa using locally made armour, visor and tools. 
While it would be conven ient if 
HD really did involve a known number 
of finite tasks that could be priorirised 
and finished with mechanical precision, 
past experience shows that th is is just 
a pipe dream. If it is accepted that 
p roblems with ERW will remain for 
decades as they have in Europe, the 
need ro develop a sustainable national 
capaci ry becomes paramoun r. 
This imperative moves HD completely 
who carne into the job marker after the 
end of the Cold War. They saw themselves 
as being "rhe right people at the right 
time." They may have been partly right, 
bur a jobs-for-the-boys approach has 
ensured that they appoint each other 
in a cycle of well meaning bur relative 
incompetence that has been impossible 
ro break to dare. 
There are a few notable exceptions-
ex-mili tary people who have set out to 
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learn about rhe coumries and culrures 
they find themselves in, and about HD as 
opposed to military minefield breaching. 
Bur the majority of those in high positions 
in this industry have no relevant training 
or preparation for a role that requires the 
intelligent promotion of"sustainable devel-
opment." Even the exceptions tend to have 
short-term appointments that do not allow 
sensible long-term planning. 
To be fai r ro them, it is not always 
obvious who should re-
place them. The "develop-
ment" profession has had 
ra ther roo many "fa il-
ures" to i nsp ire great 
confidence. So those with 
experience in development 
programmes are not nec-
essarily any better quali-
fied, and even when they 
are, they frequently believe 
that you need soldiers ro 
deal with explosives. 
The truth is t hat a 
new profession of HD is 
emerging- with peop le 
"trained" by on -the-job 
experience. Some of these 
are ex-soldiers and some 
ex-development workers. 
If the ind ustry is to 
progress, t he leaders of 
the old school must move 
as ide to ler chose who do 
have the relevant experience 
ro promote "sustainable 
demining" takeover. Many 
of these are ex-soldiers-
bur demining management 
should no t be allowed to 
be a sinecure (or a retirement 
home) for old officers. • 
*Your comments and arguments would be 
appreciated (see contact information 
below). 
*All graphics courtesy of the author. 
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